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1. Introduction
Advances in communication technologies coupled with reductions in
transportation costs have increased the scope of global trade over the past 100 years.
Recently global trade has included the export of used durable goods from developed to
less developed economies.

For example, about 10.2 million used computers – roughly

80% of all used computers collected from firms and households in the United States were exported to Asia in 2002 (Puckett and Smith, 2002). Roughly one-fourth of all
used computers collected from firms and households in Japan were exported to
developing nations in 2004 – up from just 8% in 2000 (Yoshida et al., 2009). About
2.5 million used cars and trucks were exported from the United States to Mexico
between 2005 and 2008 (Davis and Kahn, 2008).
Exporting used durable goods to developing economies for further consumption,
a concept we call “global reuse”, provides utility to consumers in developing countries
but can have negative social consequences if the resulting waste contains toxic
substances and developing nations lack appropriate disposal methods. The cathode ray
tubes of televisions and personal computers, for example, contain large amounts of lead
oxide and cadmium – substances harmful to the natural environment and human health.
The circuit boards of computers and cell phones also contain lead and cadmium.
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Modern flat-screen panel monitors contain mercury, another harmful pollutant
potentially damaging to human organs.1
Thus the waste from these durable goods can be hazardous, and advanced
disposal techniques can be necessary to mitigate external effects of disposal. Such
disposal technologies are often available in developed countries.

But less developed

importing countries such as China, Philipine, India, Pakistan, Mexico or Nigeria rarely
possess the technologies, policies, and enforcement infrastructures necessary to control
external disposal costs.

In Guiyu, China, for example, broken CRTs are regularly

dumped on open land or pushed into rivers (Puckett and Smith, 2002).

In Nigeria,

used televisions and computers are used to fill swamps (Puckett, 2005).
This paper develops a two-country model to solve for optimal taxes and
subsidies necessary in an economy with global reuse.

The model, we believe, is easy

to understand and replicate. Results are intuitive and relevant to policy formation.

In

the baseline case, developed in Section 3 of this paper, both the developed and
developing economies are able to initiate tax policies to internalize the social costs of
1

Inorganic mercury mixed with water is transformed to methylated mercury.

easily accumulates in living organisms and concentrates through the food chain.

Methylated mercury
Cadmium compounds

accumulate in the human body, particularly the kidneys, and have irreversible consequences for human
health, (Puckett and Smith, 2002).

Each cathrode ray tube contains about 2kg of lead, enough to

damage human central and peripheral nerves, which can have a deleterious effect on the growth and
development of children. Lead is also an endocrine disruptor. Yoshida (2002)
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waste disposal.

Unsurprisingly, optimal policy requires each disposal tax be set equal

to the external marginal cost within each country.

The model is then extended in

Section 4 to the more interesting case where only the developed nation can tax waste.
Under this assumption, and when coupled with a disposal tax in the developed country,
the government of the developing country can still achieve the global Pareto Optimum
by either taxing the importation of the used durable good or subsidizing consumer
return of durable waste for eventual disposal back in the developed country.

The

model in Section 5 considers the case when policy instruments are unavailable to the
developing country. The global Pareto Optimum is obtained by reducing the disposal
tax in the developed country to a level below their external marginal cost of disposal.
Before introducing the model, the next section of this paper summarizes the literature
on durable goods and the international market for waste.

2. The Literature
In a closed economy, several papers have demonstrated that the optimal policy
for internalizing the social costs of waste disposal is a tax on disposal set equal to the
external marginal cost of disposal (beginning with Wertz, 1976).

Where illegal

dumping is problematic, the disposal tax is replaced by a subsidy to recycling coupled
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with a tax on consumption – a deposit refund program (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995).
Shinkuma (2007) extends the waste policy literature for a closed-economy to the case of
durable goods by demonstrating that advanced disposal fees lead to inefficient choices
between reuse and disposal.
The solid waste literature on open economies focuses almost entirely on the
international transfer of pure waste, rather than on waste embedded in used goods.
Copeland (1991) argues that eliminating trans-national shipments of waste can improve
welfare if importing governments do not adequately regulate waste disposal or if such
regulations cause illegal dumping in those countries.

For the case of durable goods,

banning international trade may not be efficient if the additional value consumers place
on imported used durable goods exceeds the difference in external costs of disposal
between the importing and exporting country.

Rauscher (2001) also examines the

international trade in hazardous waste.
A collection of other papers examines the strategic use of waste taxes to alter
trade patterns. For example, Krutilla (1991) suggests national governments will set
waste taxes in exporting industries to levels above the external cost of disposal to
reduce supply and therefore improve international terms of trade. Waste taxes in
importing industries, on the other hand, are set below external costs to help these
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industries compete globally.

Alternatively, Kennedy (1994) argues that where

competition is imperfect, governments could (1) reduce domestic disposal taxes to
improve rents to exporting industries while at the same time (2) increase domestic
disposal taxes to encourage the transfer of waste to other countries. The first effect is
found to outweigh the second effect if the external costs of waste disposal do not extend
beyond a nation’s borders.

Cassing and Kuhn (2003) find that importing countries

levy waste taxes below the external marginal cost of disposal and below waste taxes in
exporting countries to correct for the market inefficiency caused by imperfect
competition in exporting countries. Barrett (1994) and Simpson (1995) also examine the
use of environmental waste taxes as substitutes for trade taxes.

Although we do not

model strategic trade behavior, the paper contributes to this literature by considering the
substitutability of waste and trade taxes for reaching global efficiency.
Research into closed economies with durable goods goes back at least as far as
Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994).

More recently, Thomas (2003) focuses on the

relationship between material consumption and transaction costs of second-hand
markets and Yokoo (2010) examines the impact of reuse activity on consumer welfare.
Shinkuma (2009) is the first to distinguish durable goods from non-durable goods in the
context of optimal waste policy in a global setting and finds that an advanced disposal
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fee is globally inefficient. Our study expands upon the work of Shinkuma (2009) by
considering policy options beyond a producer responsibility measure.

3. Waste Taxes Available to Both Countries (tAw>0, tBw>0)
This section develops a baseline model where both a developed and developing
country can tax waste.

This model expands upon a domestic waste model of Fullerton

and Kinnaman (1995), Fullerton and Wu (1998), and Kinnaman (2010).

The model

does not attempt to explain why one country is more economically developed than the
other, but assumes incomes and production technologies in each country are determined
exogenously.
Assume an open economy is comprised of two countries. Country A is
endowed with a technology to produce durable goods such as televisions, computers, or
automobiles.

The durable good is initially consumed only in Country A, as Country B

is assumed to not possess the technology to produce the durable good, nor do consumers
have incomes sufficient to import new durable goods from Country A.

Instead the

consumers of Country B import used durable goods from Country A.
After consuming the durable good (with quantity d), consumers in Country A
either dispose the good as waste in Country A (wA) or export the good to Country B for
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reuse (e).

Thus d = wA + e (where wA, e  0).

Once the used durable good has been

consumed in Country B, it becomes waste to be disposed in Country B (wB), thus e =
wB. Assume all of this consumption and disposal activity occurs within a single time
period. Within the context of a dynamic model, the conditions d = e + wA and e = wB
could describe a steady state.2
Assume country A is comprised of n identical consumers each with utility (UA)
defined over their own consumption of the durable good (d) and the total quantity of
waste disposed in Country A (nwA),
(1)

UA = UA(d, nwA), where Ud > 0 and Uw < 0.
Assume a global economic resource such as capital or energy (k) constitutes

the only input into five production processes.

First, the economic resource (with

quantity kd) can be employed to produce the durable good (d) in Country A according to
the production function,
(2)

d = f(kd), where f’ > 0.

Second, the economic resource (kw) can be used to collect and dispose the used durable
good as waste in Country A (wA) according to the production function
(3)

2

wA = g(kw), where g’ > 0.

See Yokoo (2010) for theoretical treatment of durable good consumption in a dynamic model.
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Third, transporting the used durable good from Country A to Country B requires the
economic resource (ke) according to e = e(ke).

This function can be inverted to solve

for ke,
(4)

ke = ke(e), where ke’>0.
In Country B, the representative consumer gains utility (UB) from consuming

the imported used durable good (e), consuming a non-durable good (c), and the
aggregate quantity of waste resulting from used durable goods (mwB, where m denotes
the number of identical consumers in Country B and recall that e = wB)
(5)

UB = UB(e, c, mwB), where UBe > 0, UBc > 0, and UBw < 0.
The non-durable good (c) is produced in Country B using the same global

economic resource available to Country A above (with quantity kc, the fourth use of the
resource) according to the production function,
(6)

c = h(kc), where h’>0.

Assume this non-durable good does not generate waste sufficient to affect the utility of
the consumers of Country B.

Examples of such a good could include agricultural

products, local services, or leisure.
Waste resulting from the used durable good consumed in Country B is
processed and disposed using the economic resource (kb) according to,
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wB = b(kb), where b’>0.

(7)

Finally, assume the total quantity of the global economic resource available to the five
production processes is k and is fully employed,

k = kd + kw + ke +kc + kb.

(8)

Social Efficiency
To achieve the Pareto Optimal allocation of the economic resource across the
five production processes, a social planner maximizes the utility of the representative
consumer in Country A subject to holding the utility of the representative consumer in
Country B constant at U B . The social planner is constrained by the materials balance
conditions (d = e + w and e = wB), the five production functions (in 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7),
and the resource constraint given in (8).

Upon substitution, the problem reduces to

choosing kw, kb, and kd to maximize the Lagrange function,
L = UA{g(kw)+b(kb), ng(kw)}
+ 1[ U B - UB {h[ k - kd – kw - ke(b(kb)) - kb], b(kb), mb(kb)}]
+ 2[f(kd) - g(kw) - b(kb)]
where 1 and 2 are Lagrange multipliers.

The latter represents the marginal utility of

producing an additional unit of the durable good.
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The first-order conditions are

(9a)

Lkw:

UAdg’ + nUAwg’ = 1[-UBch’] + 2[g’]

(9b)

Lkb:

UAdb’ = 1[-UBch’ke’b’ -UBch’ + UBeb’ + mUBwb’] + 2[b’]

(9c)

Lkd:

2[f’] = 1[-UBch’]

Divide (9a) through by g’, divide (9b) through by b’, and solve (9c) for 1 and substitute
into (9a) and (9b) to eliminate 1. We are left with,
(10a)

UAd/2 = f’/g’ + 1 - nUAw/2

(10b)

UAd/2 = f’ke’ + f’/b’ - UBef’/UBch’ - mUBwf’/UBch’ + 1

These two equations summarize the Pareto Optimal allocation of the economic
resources across the five uses in the economy.

These conditions will be compared to

those of the competitive equilibrium to determine optimal tax rates.

Competitive Equilibrium
Assume a disposal tax is available to the governments of both countries (tAw
and tBw). Assume a representative consumer in Country A faces prices pd = 1 (the
numeraire) to purchase the durable good, pAw to dispose the resulting waste from the
durable good in Country A, and receives pe for each unit of the used durable good
exported to Country B.

Assume the consumer must also pay pk for the economic

resource necessary to employ the technology in (4) to prepare and transport the used
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durable good to Country B.3

These prices give rise to the consumer’s budget

constraint,
MA = d + pAwwA + pkke(e) - pee,
where MA denotes an exogenously determined level of consumer income.

The

representative consumer maximizes utility (1) subject to the above budget constraint
and the materials balance constraint d = wA + e.

Because the number of consumers is

large (n), the representative consumer considers its own contribution to the overall
waste externality to be zero. The aggregate quantity of waste (nwA) is therefore
exogenous to the representative consumer. The consumer chooses wA and e to
maximize the Lagrange function,
L = UA(wA + e, n w A ) + ∂A[MA - (wA + e) - pAwwA - pkke(e) + pee]
where ∂A, the Lagrange multiplier, denotes the marginal utility of income.

The

first-order conditions are
(11a)

LwA:

UAd = ∂A[1+ pAw]

(11b)

Le:

UAd = ∂A[1 + pkke’ - pe].

The representative consumer purchases the durable good to the point that the marginal
3

The assumption that consumers employ the technology in (4) to export the used durable good is made

purely out of convenience.

An export firm could be added to the model that employs the same

technology and charges a price to the consumer for this service.
change.
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Optimal taxes defined below would not

utility of consumption is equal to the price of durable good plus the overall cost of each
of the two disposal options. The utility-maximizing consumer will choose between
domestic disposal and export for global reuse such that pAw = pkke’ - pe.
Assume a representative competitive firm utilizes the production technology
defined in (2) to produce the durable good. This firm chooses the quantity of the
economic resource to employ (kd) to maximize profit , π = f(kd) - pkkd.
Profit is maximized when
f’= pk

(12)

Assume a representative competitive firm collects and disposes waste in
Country A by employing the economic resource (kw) and the technology given in (3).
This firm also pays a tax of tAw on each unit of waste disposed. The firm chooses the
quantity of the economic resource (kw) to maximize profit, π = (pAw - tAw)g(kw) - pkkw.
Profit is maximized when
(13)

pAw = pk/g’ + tAw.
The representative consumer in Country B maximizes utility (5) subject to e =

wB (all imported used durable goods are disposed in Country B) and the budget
constraint, MB = pee + pcc + pBwwB, where pc is price of the non-durable good and once
again pe is the price of the used durable good imported from Country A.
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The

consumer also pays a price of pBw to dispose the waste from the durable good.
Because the number of consumers in Country B is large (at m), the representative
consumer considers the aggregate quantity of used durable goods disposed in Country B
(mwB) to be exogenous.

The Lagrange function for this constrained

utility-maximization problem is
L = UB(wB, c, m w B ) + δB[MB - pewB - pcc - pBwwB].
The first-order conditions for utility maximization are

(14)

Lwb:

UBe = δB[pe + pBw]

Lc:

UBc = δB[pc],

which can be simplified to the single condition
(15)

UBe/UBc = (pe + pBw)/pc.
The competitive firm in country B uses the technology in (6) to produce the

non-durable good to maximize profit, π = pch(kc) - pkkc, by choosing kc such that
(16)

pc = pk/h’.
Finally a competitive firm in Country B employs the disposal technology in (7)

to dispose waste from the durable good in Country.

In this baseline case the

government of Country B can tax this waste to encourage waste producers to internalize
the social costs of disposal.

Profit π = (pBw - tBw)b(kb) - pkkb is maximized when
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pBw = pk/b’+ tBw.

(17)

Substitute (16), (17), and (12) into (15) to eliminate pc, pBw, and pk. Solve the resulting
equation for pe and substitute into (11b) to eliminate pe. Then substitute (13) into (11a)
to eliminate pAw and substitute (12) into (11a) and (11b) to eliminate pk. We are left
with
(18a)

UAd/∂A = 1 + f’/g’ + tAw

(18b)

UAd/∂A = 1 + f’ke - UBef’/UBch’ + f’/b’ + tBw
These equations summarize the allocation of resources in a decentralized

economy as a function of the two waste taxes. Compare (18) with (10) and note that
the Pareto Optimum can be achieved by the competitive equilibrium when tax rates are
tAw = - nUAw/2 and tBw = - UBwf’/UBch’.

Combining (14), (16), and (12) suggests f’ =

UBch’/δB allowing the optimal tax rates to be simplified to
tAw = - nUAw/2

and

tBw = - mUBw/δB

Controlling for a few changes in notations and a few other features of the
model, this result is similar to Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995), who solve for the
optimal tax in a closed economy. A country sets a tax rate on waste disposal equal to
the external marginal cost of waste disposal (nUAw and UBw, respectively).
Lagrange multipliers convert the units of taxation from utiles to dollars.
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The

Notice that the optimal waste tax does not depend upon the durable nature of
the exported good.

If consumers in Country B gain no utility from the imported

material (UBe = 0), the optimal tax policy remains the same.

Thus, it makes little

difference to formation of optimal policy whether computers and televisions are being
exported as pure waste products or as used goods with additional consumptive value.
That the international transfer of waste is treated differently by the policy community
than the international transfer of goods embedded with waste is beyond the explanatory
scope of the model.

4. Waste not Taxed in Country B (tBw=0)
Consider the same economy as described above with the added assumption that
the government of Country B is unable to tax waste disposal.

Perhaps the economy

lacks the necessary technology (scales for weighing trucks entering and exiting
landfills, for example) or the government lacks the resources to discourage illegal
dumping that might arise with the implementation of a waste tax (Copeland, 1991).
This section explores alternative tax instruments available to government of Country B
for achieving the Pareto Optimal allocation of the economic resource when waste is
untaxed.

The first is a tax on imports of the used durable good. The second is a
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subsidy paid for the return of waste from the used durable good back to County A.

An Import Tax on the Used Durable Good (tAw>0, tBw=0, tm>0)
Assume that the government in Country B can levy a tax (tm) on each unit of the
used durable good imported from Country A.

The consumer’s budget constraint in

Country B is therefore, MB = (pe + tm)e + pcc + pBwwB. The representative consumer
maximizes utility in (5) subject to this budget constraint and the materials balance
constraint e = wB. The first-order conditions are
Lwb:

UBe = ∂B[pe + tm + pBw]

Lc:

UBc = ∂B[pc],

which can be simplified to,
(19)

UBe/UBc = (pe + tm + pBw)/pc.
The representative competitive waste disposing firm in Country B no longer

pays the disposal tax (tBw=0), but still charges market prices for disposal. Condition
(17) therefore reduces to pBw = pk/b’.
Following the same substitutions patterns described above, the allocation of
resources as function of tax rates resulting from the competitive equilibrium is
(20a)

UAd/∂A = 1 + f’/g’ + tAw
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(20b)

UAd/∂A = 1 + f’ke - UBef’/UBch’ + f’/b’ + tm
By comparing (20) to the Pareto Opimal condition in (10), the optimal waste

tax in County A (tAw) is unaffected and still equal to the external cost of disposal.

But

because County B is unable to assess a waste tax, the import tax is necessary for the
decentralized economy to achieve the Pareto Optimum.

The optimal import tax is set

equal to the external marginal cost of waste disposal in Country B, as was the original
waste tax from the previous section (thus, tm = tBw).

Both taxes (tm and tBw) increase

the overall cost of consuming the used durable good to the consumer in Country B.
The consumer responds to either tax by substituting the non-durable good (c) for the
used durable good (e) in consumption. This tax equivalency disappears if consumers
in Country B face alternatives for disposing waste (currently e = wB).

If, for example,

recycling were an option in Country B, then the waste tax would lead to efficient
quantities of waste, consumption, and recycling, but the import tax would not lead to an
inefficient choice between waste and recycling in Country B.

A Subsidy to Waste Returns (tAw>0, tBw=0, te=0, tr >0)
Consider an alternative policy approach where absent a disposal tax (tBw=0) the
government in Country B can subsidize the return to Country A of the waste from the
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used durable good.

Assume a technology is available to utilize the global economic

resource (kr) to transport the waste from the used durable back to Country A for
disposal,
wr = r(kr) where r’>0.

(22)

The representative consumer in Country B now chooses whether to dispose the waste in
Country B or return the waste to Country A, e = wB + wr (with wB, wr  0).
Based upon the materials balance constraints above, the total quantity of waste returned
to Country A (call it R for the moment) is the total quantity of the used durable good
exported to Country B (ne) less the total quantity disposed in Country B (mwB).
Because e = wB + wr, we have R = n(wB + wr) - mwB, which can be simplified to R =
(n-m)wB + nwr.

The representative consumer in Country A experiences disutility from

both sources of waste.
(23)

Thus,

UA = UA (d, nwA + R) = UA (d, nwA + (n-m)wB + nwr),

All other tastes and technologies in this economy are identical to that modeled above.
The Pareto Optimal allocation of economic resources is found by maximizing
the Lagrange function
L = UA{g(kw) + b(kb) + r(kr), ng(kw) + (n-m)b(kb) + nr(kr)}
+ 1[ U B - UB{h[k - kd - kw - ke(b(kb) + r(kr)) - kb - kr], b(kb) + r(kr), mb(kb)}]
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+ 2[ f(kd) - g(kw) - b(kb) – r(kr)],
Where U B is a constant and 1 and 2 are Lagrange multipliers. This function is
maximized over kw, kb, kr, and kd. The first-order conditions are
(24a)

Lkw: UAdg’+ nUAwg’ = 1[-UBch’] + 2[g’]

(24b)

Lkb: UAdb’ + (n-m)UAwb’= 1[-UBch’ke’b’- UBch’+ UBeb’+mUBwb’] + 2[b’]

(24c)

Lr: UAdr’ + nUAwr’ = 1 [-UBc h’ke’r’ - UBch’ + UBer’] + 2[r’]

(25d)

Lkd: 1[UBch’] + 2[f’] = 0

Divide (24a) by g’, (24b) by b’, (25c) by r’, and solve (24d) for 1 and substitute into
the three remaining conditions to get
(25a)

UAd/2 + nUAw/2 = f’/g’ + 1

(25b)

UAd/2 + (n-m)UAw/2 + mUBwf’/UBch’ = f’ke’ + f’/b’ - UBef’/UBch’ + 1

(25c)

UAd/2 + nUAw/2 = f’ke’ + f’/r’ - UBef’/UBch’ + 1

These three equations summarize the efficient global allocation of the economic
resource. These conditions will be compared below with those representing a
competitive economy.
In a decentralized economy, assume once again that the government of Country
A can assess a tax on waste disposed in Country A (tAw), which would apply to both
domestic waste and waste returned from Country B for disposal in Country A.
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Assume the only policy instrument in Country B is a subsidy (sBr) paid for the return of
waste from the used durable goods originally exported from Country A.

Although

politically problematic, the subsidy could also be offered by the government of Country
A if Country B lacks the administrative infrastructure to implement such an instrument.
In Country A, conditions for utility and profit maximization are identical to
those stated in (11a), (11b), and (12) above.

The waste disposal firm in Country A

now receives waste from both Country A and Country B.

This firm receives price,

pAw, from consumers in Country A to dispose the durable good and price, pr, from
consumers in Country B to dispose the returned waste.

The waste firm must pay the

waste tax on both domestic waste (wA) and waste returned from Country B (wr). The
waste firm employs the economic resource to facilitate two disposal technologies ((3)
and now (22)) to maximize profit, π = (pAw - tAw)wA + (pr - tAw)wr - pkkw – pkkr.

Profit

is maximized by equating
(26a)

pAw = (pk/g’ + tAw)

(26b)

pr = pk/r’ + tAw.
In Country B, the representative consumer chooses consumption and disposal

practices to maximize utility (5) subject to the condition that e = wB + wr and the budget
constraint, MB = pee + pcc + prwr + pBwwB - sBrwr, where each unit of waste returned to
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Country A (wr) receives the subsidy.

The first-order conditions for

utility-maximization are
(27a)

Lc:

UBc = δB[pc]

(27b)

Lwb:

UBe = δB[pe + pBw]

(27c)

Lwr:

UBe = δB[pe + pr - sBr]

Other profit-maximizing conditions representing the competitive economy in Country B
are the same as above ((16) and (17), but with tBw = 0).
Solve for δB in (27a) and substitute into (27b) and (27c). Then use (16), (17),
(26b), and (12) to eliminate pc, pBw, pr and pk from the remaining two equations. Then
use (12) and (26a) to eliminate pk and pAw from (11a) and (11b). (11a) becomes
(11a’)

UAd/∂A - tAw = f’/g’ + 1
Then solve (11b) for pe and substitute into (27b) and (27c) to eliminate pe.

The resulting equations are
(27b’)

UAd/δA = f’ke’ + f’/b’ - UBef’/UBch’ + 1

(27c’)

UAd/δA + sBr - tAw = f’ke’ + f’/r’ - UBef’/UBch’ + 1.

Equations (11a’), (27b)’ and (27c)’ characterize the allocation of resources in a
decentralized economy as a function of the waste tax in Country A and the subsidy for
the return of waste in Country B.

Notice that the right-hand sides of (11a’), (27b’) and
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(27c’) are equal to those of the Pareto Optimum, (25a), (25b) and (25c).

Combining

these two sets of three equations to eliminate the identical right-hand sides gives
(28a)

UAd/2 + nUAw/2 = UAd/δA - tAw

(28b)

UAd/2 + (n-m)UAw/2 + mUBwf’/UBch’ = UAd/δA

(28c)

UAd/2 + nUAw/2 = UAd/δA + sBr - tAw

Solve (28a) for tAw to get
tA*w = -nUAw/2 - UAd(1/2 - 1/δA)
Only if 2 = δA (these re both Lagrange multipliers) will the waste tax in Country A be
equal to the baseline case. Recall that 2 is the marginal utility of the durable good in
County A and that that δA is the marginal utility of exogenous income in Country A.
Given that the durable good is the numeraire (with price of 1) and is the only good that
provides utility to the consumer in Country A, the addition of $1 in income to the
consumer in County A must provide the equivalent marginal utility as the addition of
one unit of the durable good. Thus the marginal utility of income will always equal
the marginal utility of consuming the durable good, and 2 = δA.
waste is identical to the baseline case.

Thus, the tax on

Country A taxes waste according to external

marginal cost of disposal in County A.
Set (28b) equal to (28c) by eliminating (UAd/2 - UAd/δA) gives
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sB*r = - mUBwf’/UBch’ - (n-m)UAw/2 + nUAw/2 + tA*w
which, when recalling that f’ = UBch’/δB (from (14), (16), and (12)) allows the optimal
subsidy to be simplified to
sB*r = - m(UBw/δB - UAw/2) + tA*w,
where tA*w is defined as above.
There are three components to the optimal subsidy. The first we call the
“Country B Effect”, which suggests the optimal subsidy will reflect the external
marginal cost of disposal in Country B (-mUBw/δB). The subsidy increases the
opportunity cost of disposing waste in Country B and therefore causes consumers to
make efficient disposal decisions.

The “Country A Effect” suggests the optimal

subsidy should also reflect the external costs of returning waste to Country A (UAw/2).
This effect allows consumers in Country B to internalize the social disposal costs in
Country A when choosing whether or not to return waste for disposal in Country A.
The third component allows for perfect netting of the two policies. As the waste
passes from the consumer in Country B to the disposal site in Country A, it will
encounter two policy instruments (sB*r and tA*w).

This third component suggests that if

the waste tax changes in Country A, then the subsidy should also change to leave
constant the overall incentive to return waste to Country A.
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Thus, two of these three components are based upon the external costs of
disposal in Country A.

To see this, substitute for tA*w to find,

sB*r = - mUBw/δB + (m-n)UAw/2.
As external costs of disposal rise in Country A, the optimal return subsidy falls to
discourage waste from being returned to Country A (mUAw/2) and rises to preserve the
zero-net-effect of the two policy measures (-nUAw/2). The overall effect on the
subsidy is positive if n>m and is negative if n<m.

Thus if the population of Country B

is larger than that of Country A, then the value of the subsidy is inversely related to
external disposal costs in Country A.
Consider two interesting special cases.

First, assume disposal technology in

Country A has advanced to the point that all social costs of waste disposal are
internalized by consumers paying the price of waste disposal. Thus, external costs of
waste disposal are positive only in Country B (UAw = 0, UBw/δB > 0).

The optimal

subsidy reduces to sB*r = - mUBw/δB. The subsidy reflects the full external costs of
disposal in Country B.

This subsidy rate also occurs in the rare event that m = n.

Second, assume external costs of waste disposal are positive and equal in both countries
(UAw/2 = UBw/δB).

In this case sB*r = tA*w. The net incentive for returning waste to

Country A is zero as the consumer receives the subsidy but must pay the equal tax for
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disposal in Country A.

Once the waste material from the durable good is in Country

B, society is indifferent between disposal in Country A or Country B.
Note that both instruments (tAw and sBr) allow the competitive economy to
achieve the Pareto Optimal allocation of the economic resource.

The return subsidy by

itself is unable to achieve the Pareto optimum because it fails to force consumers in
Country A to internalize the social costs of disposal.

But if administering the return

subsidy is impossible, then the next section examines the case when the only global
policy instrument available is a waste tax (tAw) in Country A.

5. Only Disposal Tax in Country A (tAw>0, tBw=0, tm=0, sBr=0)
Suppose Country B is unable to assess the waste tax or the import tax, perhaps
due a previous trade agreement.

Mexico, for example, eliminated trade restrictions on

all 10-15 year-old vehicles in 2005 in accordance with the implementation of NAFTA
(Davis and Kahn (2008)).

Furthermore, to compare to the baseline case assume the

technology to return waste to Country A (in 22) is no longer available to the economy.
The only remaining tax instrument available to the global economy is the disposal tax
levied on waste disposed in County A.
The competitive decentralized allocation of the economic resource summarized
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in (20) is therefore reduced to,
(29a)

UAd/∂A = 1 + f’/g’ + tAw

(29b)

UAd/∂A = 1 + f’ke - UBef’/UBch’ + f’/b’.

Note the only difference is that the tm variable is now zero.
Recall that the Pareto Optimal allocation of resources is governed by
(10). Comparing these two sets of equations suggests the Pareto Optimum can still be
achieved by the single waste tax when
tAw = - nUAw/2 + mUBw/δB.
The waste tax in County A can be positive or negative depending upon the magnitudes
of the waste externality in each country. The waste tax in Country A is negative (a
subsidy) when - mUBw/δB > - nUAw/2, or when the waste disposal externality in
Country B is larger than in County A. The waste subsidy serves to internalize to
consumers in Country A the external costs of disposal in Country B. Consumers in
Country A respond to the subsidy by efficiently reducing exports of the used durable
goods to Country B. As was the case with the import tax discussed above, the
efficiency of this waste tax relies upon there being no recycling options in Country B.
That an open country should set a waste tax waste above or below the domestic
external cost of disposal has been found in previous studies, but for other reasons.
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Krutilla (1991) demonstrates that waste taxes are set above external marginal costs of
disposal to reduce imports and therefore improve the terms of trade. Kennedy (1993)
suggests waste taxes be set below the external marginal cost of waste to subsidize
domestic industries. Cassings and Kuhn (2003) suggest waste taxes fall below the
external marginal cost of waste to compensate for the market distortion caused by
imperfect competition in the exporting country.
Consider the interesting case when the external disposal costs are equal across
the two countries (- mUBw/δB = - nUAw/2). The optimal waste tax in this case is zero.
The competitive market place void of tax policies in either country results in the
efficient allocation of the economic resource.
A government that disregards the external costs in Country B will set the waste
tax equal to the external costs in Country A. This tax will cause consumers in Country
A to inefficiently increase efforts to export the used durable good to Country B where
tax policies do not exist. It is not clear that a government will ease domestic
environmental policies to improve environmental conditions in other countries, as is
called for to achieve a global Pareto Optimum.

5. Conclusion

27

This paper developed a model of two countries trading a used durable good for
global reuse to solve for various tax systems that allow a competitive equilibrium to
achieve the Pareto Optimal allocation of an economic resource.

If the importing

country is unable to tax waste according the external marginal cost of disposal, then the
Pareto Optimum can be achieved by the implementation of an import tax or a subsidy
paid for the return of the durable good for disposal in the original country.

If the

importing country is unable to tax imports or subsidize returns, then the Pareto
Optimum can also be achieved by a single disposal tax in the exporting country. This
tax is set below the external marginal cost of disposal in Country A to discourage
consumers from exporting the used durable good to policy-less Country B.
Many developing countries that import used durable goods lack waste taxes,
import taxes, or return subsidies. The remaining question is why. The lack of a
waste could be due to worries over illegal dumping (Copeland, 1991). The absence of
import taxes could be due to trade agreements, and the lack of a return subsidy might be
attributable to the lack of public funds necessary to finance the subsidy.

Lacking these

policies, an inefficiently high quantity of waste from durable goods is disposed in
developing countries. Perhaps the dead weight loss associated with the inefficiently
high quantity of waste is small when compared to cost of administering a tax. Or
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perhaps government agents in developing countries do not internalize the social costs of
disposal.

Citizens bearing the external costs of disposal are unable to put public

pressure on government.

References
S. P. Anderson and V. A. Ginsburgh, Price discrimination via second-hand markets,
European Economic Review 38, 23-44 (1994).
S. Barrett, Strategic environmental policy and international trade, Journal of Public
Economics 54, 325-38 (1994).
J. Cassing and T. Kuhn, Strategic environmental policies when waste products are
tradable, Review of International Economics 11, 495-511 (2003).
B. R. Copeland, International trade in waste products in the presence of illegal disposal,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20, 143-162 (1991).
L. W. Davis and M. E. Kahn, International trade in used durable goods: The
environmental consequences of NAFTA, NBER Working Paper 14565 (2008).
D. Fullerton and T. C. Kinnaman, Garbage, recycling, and illicit burning or dumping,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29, 78-91 (1995).
D. Fullerton and W. Wu, Policies for green design, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 36, 131-148 (1998)
P. W. Kennedy, Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect
competition, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27, 49-63 (1994).
T.C. Kinnaman, Optimal solid waste tax policy with centralized recycling, National Tax
Journal 63(2), 237-252 (2010).
K. Krutilla, Environmental regulation in an open economy, Journal of Environmental

29

Economics and Management 20, 127-42 (1991).
J. Puckett and T. Smith, “Exporting harm”, The Basel Action Network and Silicon
Valley Toxics Coalition (2002).
J. Puckett, “The digital dump: Exporting re-use and abuse to Africa”, The Basel Action
Network (2005).
M. Rauscher, International trade in hazardous waste, in “International environmental
economics: A survey of the issues” (G. G. Schulze and H. W. Ursprung Ed.), Oxford
Univ. Press, (2001).
T. Shinkuma, Reconsideration of an advanced disposal fee policy for end-of-life durable
goods, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53, 110-121 (2007).
T. Shinkuma, Extended producer responsibility in a developed country and the effect on
international trade, the environment, and social welfare, unpublished paper (2009)
R. D. Simpson, Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly, Environmental and
Resource Economics 6, 359-69 (1995).
V. M. Thomas, Demand and dematerialization impacts of second-hand markets, Journal
of Industrial Ecology 7, 65-78 (2003).
H. -F. Yokoo, An economic theory of reuse, Sustainability Science 5, 143-150 (2010).
A. Yoshida, T. Tasaki and A. Terazono, Material ﬂow analysis of used personal
computers in Japan, Waste Management 29, 1602-14 (2009).
F. Yoshida, Information technology waste problems in Japan, Environmental
Economics and Policy Studies 5, 249-260 (2002).
K. Wertz, Economic factors influencing households’ production of refuse, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 2, 263-72 (1976).

30

